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Managing disagreement through yes, but… constructions: 
An argumentative analysis  
 
Abstract 
The goal of this study is to examine the argumentative functions of concessive yes, 
but… constructions. Based on (N=22) interview transcripts, we examine the ways 
environmental activists negotiate their agreements and disagreements over climate 
change through yes, but… constructions. Starting from conversational analyses of such 
concessive sequences, we develop an account grounded in argumentative discourse 
analysis, notably pragma-dialectics. The analysis focuses on how in conceding 
arguments speakers re-present others’ discourse, what types of criticism they exercise 
through particular sequential patterns, and which argumentative techniques they 
saliently use. We show in particular that, in disputing the standpoints supported by the 
complex argumentation they encounter, speakers raise different types of criticism 
(sufficiency, relevance, acceptability). We discuss how examining not only the 
sequencing of agreements and disagreements, but also to the argumentative relations 
that generate these, may extend our understanding of such concessive constructions. 
 
Keywords: agreement prefaces, argumentation analysis, climate change, concession, 
disagreement, dissociation, pragma-dialectics, relevance, sufficiency
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Introduction 
An environmental activist responds in the following way to a video in which climate 
“sceptics” contest the scientific consensus on the human causes of climate change:  
[…] yes, it’s true, in the past years, of the past of the Earth, millions of years, there was many 
many climate changes, but now we are provoking these climate changes. It’s us with our pollution, 
so… 
We are clearly in an argumentative situation here – a speaker addresses opposing 
views and supports her own with reasons (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004). One 
explicit element of this argumentative discourse are linguistic markers or indicators – 
prominently, the yes, but… construction. One may wonder, however, what exactly do 
such elements mark or indicate? In other words, while the linguistic form yes, but… is 
clearly present in this and many other argumentative exchanges, what are its functions? 
Our goal in this paper is to investigate the argumentative functions of yes, but… 
and similar constructions, extending the literature that has dealt with such concessive 
patterns. Until now the predominant focus in conversation and discourse analyses that 
have looked at yes, but… constructions has been on describing the sequential patterns of 
agreement and disagreement (e.g. Antaki & Wetherell, 1999; Couper-Kuhlen & 
Thompson, 2000), without taking full account of their argumentative functions. We 
adopt the perspective of argumentation theory (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004) for 
devising a theoretically grounded account of the functions of these concessive 
constructions, arguing that a mere sequential analysis cannot adequately account for 
these (see Jacobs & Jackson, 1989). We examine both the content and variability of the 
arguments, exploring (1) whether the same sequential pattern (yes, but…) can be used 
for conveying different types of argumentative criticism, e.g. sufficiency, relevance, 
acceptability (Johnson & Blair, 1994); (2) whether variations of this sequential pattern 
always convey different types of argumentative criticism; (3) what these concessive 
constructions further indicate concerning the dialogical uses of argumentation (e.g. re-
presentation, dissociation); and (4) what functions these uses serve. 
For that, we focus on exchanges from the climate change (CC) debate. The topic 
and type of situation we analyse lend themselves particularly well to argumentative 
analysis. CC is an ongoing debate with significant societal consequences, characterised 
both by a series of controversies and by a fragile societal consensus on some aspects 
(Hulme, 2009).  
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The paper starts with a summary of the literature that focuses on the sequencing 
of agreements and disagreements in concessive yes, but… constructions. We then 
provide an overview of how these concessive constructions are treated in argumentation 
theory. After presenting our corpus and methods, we follow with a detailed 
argumentative analysis of some representative examples of yes, but… from the corpus. 
Finally, we discuss two issues concerning re-signification emergent in our analysis: 
dissociation and re-presentation of others’ discourse. 
Sequential treatment of concessive constructions 
Discourse and conversation analysts have long scrutinised the dialogical uses of yes, 
but… and similar constructionsi. In her seminal study, Pomerantz (1984) treated but as a 
marker that allows expressing conversationally dispreferred disagreements under the 
conditions of the preference for agreement. The partial agreement signalled by the yes-
clause was seen to delay and soften the confrontational elements contained in the but-
clause. Much of the following literature has confirmed and extended Pomerantz’s 
analyses (Mulkay, 1985; Billig, 1991; Antaki & Wetherell, 1999). For instance, Mulkay 
(1985) and Billig (1991) have shown how initial expressions of agreement, or 
agreement prefaces, are used for devising argumentation in a more agreeable way. The 
initial agreement has also been examined as a device for mitigating the face-threatening 
nature of confrontational, argumentative discourse in conversation (Czerwionka, 2012; 
Holtgraves, 1997; Obeng, 1997; Rees-Miller, 2000; Sifianou, 2012).  
Among the efforts to systematise the sequencing of agreements and disagreements 
one may count Couper-Kuhlen and Thompson’s (2000) analysis of cardinal 
concessives. In this concede-and-contrast sequence co-produced by two speakers, B’s 
concession (X’) to A’s original proposition (X), is a version of A’s original point, which 
nevertheless allows B to uphold her own contrasting proposition (Y).  
Speaker:   Structure:                              Symbolically: 
A:     Proposition                        X 
B:     Concession                X’ 
             Contrasting proposition      Y 
B’s sequence (X’-Y) can prototypically be realised through yes, but… 
constructions. Couper-Kuhlen and Thompson (2000) also discuss two important 
derivations of the cardinal scheme. In the first derivation, the contrasting position (Y) is 
not explicitly expressed, but only signalled by the – prosodic or semantic – way the 
concession is made (X’ only implying Y). In the second derivation, which is well 
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documented (e.g. Antaki & Wetherell, 1999; Lindström & Londen, 2013), the 
contrasting position is expressed two times. Here, the concessive move comes only after 
the utterance of a contrasting position – an initial disagreement (Y) – which is reprised 
after the concessive move.  
For Antaki and Wetherell (1999), this proposition-concession-reprise sequence 
(Y-X’-Y’) is initiated by speaker B expressing her position, followed by a somewhat 
disingenuous show concession, and concluded by reasserting her initial position. “It 
makes a show of using a form which, ostensibly, is evidence that the speaker 
appreciates the other side’s point of view, displaying to listeners that the speaker is not 
wholly blind to others’ positions” (Antaki & Wetherell, 1999, p. 24). By contrast, “not 
making a show of it [concession] tends towards making it sound like its ‘literal’, 
dictionary definition of agreement and yielding” (p. 12). In other words, speakers can 
either make concessions (X’) seriously, abandoning their position (Y), or just concede 
to X “for show”, thereby being able to maintain Y. 
However, Antaki and Wetherell (1999) also admit that the proposition-
concession-reprise structure “is the sort of device that might be particularly 
advantageously used when the speaker is in an environment where being rational and 
fairminded is at a premium” (p. 25). In our view, this suggests that arguers can make 
genuine concessions (X’) while upholding their initial position, and “re-launch it as a 
basis for further discussion and negotiation” (Lindström & Londen, 2013, p. 349). On 
these grounds, Lindström and Londen have argued that “the practice of conceding and 
reasserting does not limit itself to specific rhetoric purposes” and is a generally 
available device that “enhances intersubjectivity in interaction” (p. 331). A similar point 
is made by studies employing the approach of Social Representations (Castro & Batel, 
2008; Mouro & Castro, 2012). These have emphasised how concessive constructions 
are orientated towards negotiation, playing an important role in the re-signification and 
hybridisation of conflicting meanings (Castro, 2012). This is achieved by distinguishing 
what is considered acceptable at the level of the societal debate (expressed in the yes-
clause) from what is contested (in the but-clause) in the on-going interaction in which 
arguments are privileged according to other, contextual, specificities (Mouro & Castro, 
2012). Couper-Kuhlen and Thompson (2000, p. 385) similarly observe that while in 
general “X and Y are understood by participants as potentially contrasting”:  
[T]he nature of the potential contrast in the third move [Y] is open, since people’s inferential 
capabilities are open. That is, the exact way in which X and Y are understood by the participants 
as contrasting is not definable in advance, but is interpreted and negotiated by the participants in 
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the situated context. In some contexts, for example, Y is taken by the participants to directly 
contrast with X, while in others Y may contrast with an inference from X, rather than X itself. 
(Couper-Kuhlen & Thompson, 2000, p. 382) 
This summary thus highlights that “the nature of the potential contrast” between 
conceding (yes…) and (re)asserting (but…) remains somewhat obscure in the literature, 
and reinforces the need to develop a better understanding of what exactly happens – in 
terms of argumentation – between these two conversational units. Therefore, in the 
following section we take the clarification of the argumentative relations between the 
yes- and the but-clauses as our main task, and then focus on them in our analysis. 
Argumentative functions of yes, but... constructions 
From the perspective of argumentation theory, the first important clarification concerns 
the relations between the concession (X’) and the contrasting proposition (Y). In her 
extension of the work of Anscombre and Ducrot on the argumentative functions of but, 
Snoeck Henkemans (1995) examines these relations at length. Consider the following 
constructed dialogue, based on an example (“This restaurant is good, but expensive”) 
discussed by Snoeck Henkemans (p. 284): 
[Two friends discussing where to go for dinner] 
A:  It’s a good restaurant. (So let’s go there!) 
B:  Yes, it’s good, but expensive. (So let’s go somewhere else!) 
In her utterance, B first accepts the good quality (X) of the restaurant, and then 
introduces another concern – its expensiveness (Y). Following Anscombre and Ducrot, 
but can be said to function here in the following way: (1) X counts as a possible 
argument p for a possible conclusion R, (2) Y is presented as an argument q against this 
conclusion, and, crucially, (3) q is presented as a more important argument for not-R 
than p is for R. Hence, B’s utterance (p but q) can be seen as a defence of not-R. This 
happens when speaker B admits that an argument p advanced in support of R is true or 
acceptable, but does not justify R in the particular context, given that there is q.  
In sum, through the yes-clause an arguer “accepts the propositional content of the 
argument, but rejects its argumentative potential” in the but-clause (Snoeck Henkemans, 
1995, p. 287), and can thus uphold her standpoint in that situation. The fact that the 
argumentative potential of a proposition may be rejected brings to the fore what has so 
far been overlooked in the analyses of concessive constructions: that speakers can 
employ different types of argumentative criticism. According to one well-known 
typology of criticism (Johnson & Blair, 1994), an arguer can reject the acceptability of 
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an opponent’s argument (it’s not true), its sufficiency to justify the standpoint (it’s not 
enough), or its relevance for supporting the standpoint (it doesn’t matter).  
Furthermore, Snoeck Henkemans (1995) considers some variations of Anscombre 
and Ducrot’s structure. Noticeably, after but an arguer can directly express the 
conclusion not-R, instead of an argument q against R: 
B:  Yes, it’s good, but (still) I don’t think we should go there. 
Another important variation regards the relative weights of p and q – instead of q 
counting as weightier a reason than p, the two may count more or else equally: 
B:  Yes, it’s good, but expensive, so I don’t really know if to go there or not. 
A second important clarification, from the perspective of argumentation theory, 
concerns what actually is conceded in the affirmative yes-clause; i.e., the relationship 
between A’s X and B’s X’, in Couper-Kuhlen and Thompson’s (2000) cardinal 
concessive scheme. While each X’ involves some departure from X, the cases in which 
the differences between the two are significant further complicate the analysis: What are 
we to make of cases where a speaker concedes to a significantly different version of 
someone else’s point? Is she conceding or is she not? Many conversation analysts take 
pains to avoid passing normative judgements regarding the quality of the conceded 
discourse (e.g. Antaki & Wetherell, 1999). Yet, when they speak of “Trojan Horse” 
concessions making “a caricature description of the other side’s case” (1999, p. 17ff.), 
they just stop short of calling it a fallacy. 
Recent work on interpretation in dialogical argumentation (Lewiński, 2011, 2012; 
Lewiński & Oswald, 2013) has examined the issue of re-presentation “of the other 
side’s case”, with the aim of differentiating between acceptable and “caricature” 
(fallacious, straw man) re-presentations. This task requires both a descriptive analysis of 
pragmatic and rhetorical mechanisms behind re-presentations of others’ argumentation, 
and a normative study of the violations of conditions for a reasonable argumentative 
discussion. While this work acknowledges there are no “real” or “objective” 
interpretations (Lewiński, 2012), it argues that there is a contextually plausible space for 
interpreting disagreements and arguments. 
Based on these insights, our specific goals in this paper are to examine:  
(1) whether a certain sequential pattern (the cardinal yes, but…) is used for conveying a 
certain type of argumentative criticism; i.e., sufficiency, relevance, acceptability;  
(2) whether different sequential patterns (cardinal and proposition-concession-reprise) 
are used for conveying different types of argumentative criticism;  
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(3) what the concessive constructions indicate concerning the dialogical uses and 
functions of argumentation (e.g. re-presentation of other’s discourse, dissociation); 
(4) what these constructions accomplish for the arguers who exercise them. 
Material and method  
The research reported here is part of a larger study on communication of climate 
change. For it, (N = 22) interviews were conducted between September 2011 and 
February 2012 with experts and activists from environmental NGOs. All participants 
had good command of English – the language of the interviews. Coming from different 
countries (Portugal and Turkey) and backgrounds (natural and social sciences), but 
working in similar institutional settings (e.g. BirdLife Partners, World Wildlife Fund, 
Greenpeace), the interviewees were assumed to be actors in a global climate change 
discourse and governance regime. 
The interviews (mean duration = 75 minutes) consisted of three parts, and the 
analysis reported here focuses on the third part, in which short video-excerpts were 
presented – via a notebook computer – to the interviewees in order to instigate 
argumentative episodes and foster debate. The first video-excerptii features two 
“sceptic” scientists who contest the scientific consensus on the human causes of CC, 
criticising the peer-reviewing process of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC). The second video-excerptiii features a climate activist who contests the 
utility of carbon offsetting – e.g. paying a small sum to “offset” one’s carbon emissions 
when buying a plane ticket – arguing that such mechanisms targeting individual 
consumers should not be used as a solution “against the threat of climate crisis”, 
because our efforts should concentrate on “more profound systemic changes in the way 
we organize our societies and economies”. 
Open-ended questions were asked after presenting each video-excerpt, starting 
always with “What do you think the person in the video is saying?”. The assumption 
was that the “main argumentative opponents” of the interviewees were the persons 
featured in the video-excerpt (i.e., “sceptic” scientists, a climate activist). The 
interviewees were thus not directly involved in an interactive argumentative encounter, 
and could argue against opponents’ points made in the video without having to manage 
on-the-spot argumentative reactions (rebuttals, counter-arguments) and other aspects of 
situated conversations (face-work, authority asymmetries, etc.). For these reasons, and 
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in view of the goals of the study, all the interviews were transcribed without using a 
detailed transcription system for spoken discourse (see O’Connell & Kowal, 2009).  
In analysing the argumentative episodes, specific attention was paid to the 
indicators of confrontation and concessions. At a first step, we identified the concessive 
constructions in the corpus. Then, we distinguished between those constructions that (1) 
comply with the cardinal concessive scheme, (2) involve a proposition-concession-
reprise structure and (3) cannot be classified into either of the above due to complex 
argumentative moves and concessions accomplished. 
At a further step, we employed the methods of argumentation theory for 
examining how the sequencing of agreements and disagreements was accomplished. 
This involved paying attention to what precisely was conceded to and criticised (i.e., the 
content of “the standpoint”, “the argument”, or “the linking premise” connecting the 
argument to the standpointiv). To do this, we reconstructed the arguments raised in the 
video-excerptsv, and in the yes, but... sequences from our corpus, following the 
procedures described in van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004).  
We use the pragma-dialectical approach for three reasons. The first is grounded in our 
data and the design of the study. Unlike in most studies in conversation and discourse 
analysis, the interviewees were not primarily dealing with the complexities of ongoing 
interaction with their opponent(s). This paves the way for argumentation to be a central 
aspect in the tapestry of communicative functions (e.g. turn-taking, politeness). The second 
reason relates to the nature of the object of study, the yes, but… constructions. As 
mentioned, conversation analysts stress that these constructions work best when “being 
rational and fairminded is at a premium” (Antaki & Wetherell, 1999, p. 25). A methodical 
analysis of the (ideal) pragmatic conditions for “rational and fairminded” discussions lies at 
the very core of pragma-dialectics. The third reason pertains to the theoretical and analytic 
tools pragma-dialectics provides: Although focusing on the argumentative aspect of 
discourse, it does so using broader insights from conversation and discourse analysis (see 
esp. van Eemeren et al., 1993). It understands discourse as a “critical discussion” where 
disagreements are managed through reasons, and offers pragmatically rich tools for 
“reconstructing” natural discourse in terms of argumentative relations. 
Using this argumentative approach, specific attention was then paid to the 
relations between the concession and the criticism advanced in each sequence. More 
than 10% of the identified sequences were reconstructed, compared and discussed by 
the first three authors, and the discrepancies (about the main difference of opinion, the 
role of the conceded argument in the opponent’s claim, the role of the argument 
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criticised) were resolved, stabilising the analysis. Finally, we selected some of the 
shorter excerpts that illustrate the potential contribution of the methods of 
argumentation theory to the analysis of concessive constructions. 
Analysis 
We identified a total of N=139 concessive constructions in the corpus, organised, one 
way or another, in the yes, but… form. More than half of these complied with the 
cardinal concessive scheme, and about a quarter was embedded in a proposition-
concession-reprise structure. In 133 cases the disagreement was marked by a but (other 
markers were however, even if and although). Agreement was marked in only 44 cases, 
mostly by of course (N=16), and yes (N=13), but also by certainly, obviously, sure, ok, 
maybe, I agree (utterances such as “We can understand that...” were not counted as 
markers). The analysis starts with the second episode, where the utility of carbon offsets 
is questioned.  
Cardinal scheme 1: Sufficiency criticism 
In the second episode, the climate activist featured in the video-excerpt (henceforth, the 
activist) contests the utility of carbon offsetting mechanisms by drawing a contrast 
between such consumer-based efforts and broader systemic changes argumentation (see 
Appendix 2 for our reconstruction of the activist’s arguments). Our interviewees clearly 
oriented to various elements of his complex argumentation by skilfully picking up 
different points to concede and to refute.  
Excerpt 1 – Interview 2 
Ethically what he’s saying is true, but actually as when you consult, think about human 
psychology, I think that you need to push people, eeeh.. well, not need to but, certain 
mechanisms might be more effective in achieving the results, I would say...  
The cardinal type of concession carried out here does not make explicit what is 
conceded to, except for merely endorsing an ethical point in generic terms, and thereby 
treating the view offered by the activist as a conventional one (Mouro & Castro, 2012): 
Yes (X’) What he says is ethically true 
But (Y) We actually need certain mechanisms to be more effective in achieving the results 
In such cases, in order to make explicit the difference of opinion and what is 
conceded to (X), the content of the but-clause (Y) becomes the primary source (Snoeck 
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Henkemans, 1995). The interviewee’s position can be reconstructed as contrasting the 
ethical standing of carbon offsetting to the effectiveness of those “mechanisms”: 
 
Yes 
But 
 
(1) (Carbon offsetting should be used as a mechanism against the threat of climate crisis) 
1.1a Carbon offsetting may be (criticised as) unethical 
1.1b Offsetting mechanisms may be more effective in achieving the results 
(1.1’) (The need to achieve results is more important than ethical considerations) 
 
p 
q 
In order to understand how the concession works, it is important to identify what 
can be conceded to as “ethical” in the activist’s argument. This can most plausibly be 
the argument that carbon offsetting has been created to exploit the rising levels of 
climate consciousness. However, and crucially, the interviewee does not make this 
concession explicit. What is regarded as “ethically true” can also be the argument that 
carbon offsetting makes people think that they don’t have to worry about the choices 
they make (see Appendix 2). In other words, the concession is permitted to “float”, 
giving the vagueness necessary for the continuation of an argumentative discourse 
(Moscovici, 1994, p. 169; see Eisenberg, 2007), and for directing the talk towards the 
argumentative interests of the interviewee (van Rees, 2006). This ambiguity makes the 
concession look like it is made to all “what he says”, appropriating the activist’s critical 
comments as commonplace and broadly acceptable.  
In the but-clause, the interviewee then introduces the argument of effectiveness 
(1.1b, let us call it q). By dissociating between what is ethical and what the actual 
problematic circumstances require, the interviewee – having agreed that there are 
legitimate ethical concerns – argues that under the given circumstances that we need to 
achieve results, the concerns of effectiveness take precedence. Hence, the first example 
of cardinal concessions can be summarised as: 
Concession 1 
A: p; if p then R; so R 
B: Yes p but q (where q is more important than p), and since if q then not-R; so not-R 
The conclusion of the interviewee’s argument (namely that carbon offsetting 
should be used as a mechanism against the threat of climate crisis) is conveyed 
indirectly by means of the counter-argument about effectiveness, which is presented as 
an argument to be privileged under the concrete circumstances. This type of concessive 
yes, but… construction, which was the most common in our corpus, works in the way 
that Anscombre and Ducrot considered the prototypical argumentative function of but 
(Snoeck Henkemans, 1995): a concession (yes, p) is overridden by a counter-argument 
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(but q) that is presented as more important in the concrete situation. As a result, the 
arguer (our interviewee) indirectly contradicts the standpoint (R) of the opponent (the 
activist), by raising a sufficiency criticism. This criticism accepts p as a serious 
argument in general, but denies that it is sufficient to justify R under given specific 
circumstances. Hence, it does not expel the opponent’s argument from the debate, or 
future instantiations of the debate (Castro & Batel, 2008).  
Cardinal scheme 2: Relevance criticism 
In the argumentative episode initiated by the “sceptic” scientists who contested the 
scientific consensus on the human causes of CC, a key strategy employed by the 
interviewees was to first admit the uncertainties, and then criticise the sceptics’ fixation 
on certainty. This was carried out through concessions that are similar to the example 
above in their sequential structure, but different in the type of criticism raised through 
this structure. 
Excerpt 2 – Interview 15 
…[in order] to be sure, that the change in greenhouse effect, the gases caused this effect, you must 
cause this effect and measure. You could not make trials with land, with earth. So you have the 
probability, not... you have... you are not sure 100%. (…) So, I could not as a scientist say, as a 
scientist, this is caused by that. As a scientist I could not, but as a politic, I must change the point 
of view. (…) If it is plausible that this action of the man caused an effect that are irreversible, this 
action could not, not must not, could not take place. The same for that, this is plausible, not sure, 
but it’s plausible, that the gases… So, the politics must take action. 
Let us first note that the cardinal concessive reconstructed below is recycled at the 
end of the excerpt as embedded in a proposition-concession-reprise structure: 
Yes X’ As a scientist, I cannot say that the anthropogenic gases caused the change in the 
greenhouse effect, you have a probability, you cannot be 100% sure  
But Y As a political person, I must change the point of view; if this is plausible, politics must 
take action 
In this yes, but... construction, the interviewee does not directly address the 
sceptics’ controversial position regarding the lack of consensus among the IPCC 
scientists, but an inference from and a crucial assumption supporting it (see Appendix 
1). Against what he discerns as the sceptics’ claims, the interviewee argues in the 
following way: 
 
Yes 
1  Politics must take action regarding the change in the greenhouse effect 
1.1a   Scientifically, it is not possible to be sure that the anthropogenic gases 
not-R 
p 
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But 
 
 
cause the change in the greenhouse effect  
1.1b   It is plausible that human action causes an irreversible greenhouse effect 
1.1’ If it is plausible that a human action causes an irreversible effect, politics 
must take action to not let that effect take place 
 
q 
if q, 
not-R  
In the yes-clause, positioning himself as a scientist, the interviewee concedes that 
there is only a probability – and not certainty – regarding the human causes of CC. In 
the but-clause, taking the role of a political person, he raises criticism by drawing on the 
plausibility of the causal relation and its action implications. It is this move from 
probability to plausibility – and the accompanying shift from theoretical to practical 
reasoning – that makes this indirect disagreement compelling. This “identity shift” 
(Castro & Batel, 2008) makes it possible to rhetorically re-signify what is conceded to.  
Through this concession, the interviewee not only demonstrates that he is as 
fastidious as the “sceptic” scientists, but also maintains that the particular case of CC 
does not lend itself to the approach of experimental verification. In the but-clause, we 
have a reformulation of the concession (1.1b) and an explicit linking premise (1.1’). The 
latter replaces the linking premise of the argument used by the “sceptic” scientist (that 
scientific consensus is a necessary condition for taking action about CC) and renders 
irrelevant the need for scientific consensus. In a way, the interviewee argues that what 
we need is a consideration of practical consequences, rather than a sweeping 
experimental demonstration or theoretical certainty. His concession can be represented 
as follows: 
Concession 2 
A: p; (if p then R); so R 
B: Yes p but not-(if p then R); so not-R 
It is worth noting that this concession is carried out by significantly re-interpreting 
the arguments conveyed in the video-excerpt. This is a major complication encountered 
in analysing the concessive constructions, to which we will return below.  
Cardinal scheme 3: Acceptability criticism 
Not in all analysed cases did the conceding argument involve an undivided acceptance 
of the argument presented by the opponent. In the excerpt below, the interviewee 
accepts only partly the opponent’s argument. 
Excerpt 3 – Interview 12 
(…) in his opinion, what should happen would be systemic change, so we have to change the way 
our society is organized. And he thinks that personal action, individual actions contribute not that 
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much to- to... offset the problem. And I can agree with him that the fundamental changes have to 
be made on a very big scale, but I would not diminish the role or importance of individual 
responsibility and how individuals can themselves try to offset. (…) In the beginning of the video 
he says that the offsets are just, just an issue of peace of mind, that’s not true. Because an offset 
can actually be an offset, even if it’s just a percentage of the emission you are responsible for. If 
you put a tree in a place that didn’t have any tree you are contributing a little bit, for a little bit of 
carbon to be captured in the next years.  
In the first part of this excerpt, the interviewee recapitulates the two major points 
made by the activist: “what should happen would be systemic change” and “individual 
actions do not contribute much to offset the problem”. In doing that, he re-presents the 
activist’s argument as follows (the argumentation is marked by the letter O to indicate that 
this is a re-representation by the interviewee of his Opponent’s position): 
 (O1) (Carbon offsetting should not be used as a mechanism against the threat of climate 
crisis) 
O1.1a Systemic change is needed in response to the climate crisis 
(O1.1b) (Individual actions are not what is needed in response to the climate crisis) 
O1.1b.1 Individual actions do not contribute much to offset the problem 
R 
 
(p1) 
(p2) 
(p3) 
He then concedes to the first of these (O1.1a, p1), and challenges the second 
(O1.1b, p2), by constructing a yes, but… sequence of the cardinal type: 
Yes (X’) I can agree that fundamental changes have to be made on a very big scale 
But (Y) I would not diminish the role or importance of individual responsibility and how 
individuals can themselves try to offset 
Here, the interviewee concedes to the necessity of big scale (systemic) changes, 
but disagrees with his opponent’s main position against the use of carbon offsetting as a 
mechanism to encounter the threat of climate crisis: 
 
Yes 
But 
(1) (Carbon offsetting should be used as a mechanism against the threat of climate crisis) 
1.1a Fundamental changes on a very big scale are necessary 
1.1b Individual offsetting actions are as necessary 
not-R 
p1’ 
p2 
Once again, a crucial complication in analysing this concessive construction is 
that the interviewee significantly re-interprets the activist’s argument: The activist 
claims that carbon offsetting should not be used as a mechanism against the threat of 
climate crisis since “what really needs to happen” are “the bigger systemic changes” 
(see Appendix 1). The interviewee first re-presents what the activist says: “in his 
opinion, what should happen would be systemic change”. Then, he goes on to “agree 
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with him that the fundamental changes have to be made on a very big scale” (note that 
for the activist, this is an argument that supports his standpoint, R). Yet, he finishes by 
contradicting the activist’s standpoint: “but I would not diminish the role or importance 
of... how individuals can themselves try to offset”. 
The crucial discursive task lies here in negotiating the meaning of the phrase that 
a systemic change is “what really needs to happen” or “what should happen”. The 
activist is clearly defending that “what really needs to happen” – systemic changes – 
should be our primary and only concern’, and we should exclude distracting measures 
such as individual carbon offsets. Our interviewee takes this to instead signify an 
important, but not only concern – individual actions are then complementary with it. 
This shift of meaning from exclusivity to complementarity of “what needs to happen” 
makes possible both the concession (X’) and the opposition (Y). Taking the 
argumentative aspect of the concession into account, the concession can be represented 
as follows:  
Concession 3 
A: p1; p2; (if p1 & p2 then R); so R 
B: Yes p1 but not-p2; so not-R 
This concession is quite typical of the concessions carried out in the second 
argumentative episode. In it, the interviewee concedes to one part of the activist’s 
argumentation but rejects another part of it, making the argumentation as a whole 
unacceptable. While the yes-clause accepts some of the activist’s arguments, the but-
clause expresses an acceptability criticism to other arguments and thus justifies the 
disagreement with the opponent’s standpoint on the basis of that criticism.           
Such examination of argumentative relations gives us a good idea of the 
similarities and differences between the concessions analysed. The three are similar in 
their sequential organisation (they instantiate the cardinal concessive scheme) as well as 
in the fact that they all involve agreement with an argument (yes, p) but not with its 
conclusion (but not R). They are different, however, in the basis on which the 
disagreement is justified. In the first concession, interviewee 2 introduced a counter-
consideration that is an example of sufficiency criticisms: yes, his argument is 
acceptable but not sufficient to justify the standpoint. In the second concession, 
interviewee 15 instead rejected the relevance of the conceded argument to the 
standpoint (not (if p then R)). This is an elaborate example of relevance criticisms: yes, 
they are right but it does not really matter here. In the third concession, by 
distinguishing between the acceptable and unacceptable parts of the opponent’s 
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argument, interviewee 12 rejected the standpoint on the basis of the unacceptable 
argument (yes, p1, but not-p2). This is an example for acceptability criticisms, which can 
only be raised against a part of the encountered argument in the context of yes, but… 
constructions (the yes-clause indicates that argumentation is partly acceptable). The 
concessions are thus embedded in different types of criticism and their analysis 
demonstrates the importance of taking the content of arguments into account for 
understanding their functions (Johnson & Blair, 1994; Snoeck Henkemans, 1992). 
Proposition-Concession-Reprise structure: Different argumentative relations? 
Interviewee 12 in excerpt 3 above resorts to a further concession in the latter part of the 
excerpt, regarding the argument of the activist that carbon offsets are sold merely as “a 
peace of mind”. He first directly rejects it: “That’s not true” (not-R). His claim comes 
right after: “An offset can actually be an offset” (R). The concession carried out 
afterwards using an even if construction – similar to that of yes, but… in its sequencing 
– can be structurally analysed as follows: 
 (Y) An offset can actually be an offset (It’s a relevant contribution) 
Even if (X’) It’s just a percentage of the emissions you are responsible for 
 (Y’) If you put an additional tree, you are contributing to the carbon to be captured in the 
next years 
The concession in this example involves a proposition-concession-reprise 
structure (Antaki & Wetherell, 1999). While it structurally differs from the foregoing 
examples, a more careful look at the argumentative relations would clearly show that 
this concession is embedded in a sufficiency criticism, just like concession 1.  
The interviewee agrees that the contribution of an offset may be just a little bit of 
what you are responsible for, and in reprise he disagrees with the activist’s argument 
that you cannot neutralize your emissions once they’re out there. In relation to this 
disagreement, the interviewee can be seen to argue that: 
 
Yes 
 
But 
1 An offset can actually offset (neutralize) your emissions 
1.1a  Contribution of an offset may be just a percentage, a little bit of what you are 
responsible for 
1.1b An offset is an additional effort of capturing carbon  
1.1’ If there is additionality, a contribution is made  
Not-R 
p  
 
q 
 
In the conceding argument 1.1a, the interviewee may be seen to render his 
opponent’s case (see Appendix 2) as follows: 
 O1 You cannot neutralize your emissions once they’re out there. R 
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O1.1 The contribution of an offset is just a little bit, a percentage of what you are 
responsible for 
p  
Through this rhetorical move, he transforms the activist’s argument against 
neutralisation of one’s emissions into something that he can concede to (1.1a) and 
criticise (1.1b). The latter involves a new consideration, namely the additionality of 
possible contributions, which is presented as more important than what was conceded. 
Hence, the interviewee’s concession functions as follows: 
Concession 4  
A: p; if p then R; R 
B: Yes p but q (where p is more important than q); so not-R 
From the argumentative perspective, such a concession is similar to the 
concession made by interviewee 2, analysed above in excerpt 1. The interviewee 
accepts an argument (p) but not its conclusion (R) because he brings about a counter-
argument (q) that is considered more important. The two are similar despite their 
different sequential structures. 
Discussion 
We set out with the aim to investigate the argumentative functions of yes, but… 
constructions used by participants in the controversial debates on CC. The scrutiny of 
the material revealed that much of the discursive business carried out by our 
interviewees belongs to the realm of managing disagreement. By resorting to yes, but… 
constructions, they presented themselves as reasonable agents that fulfil their 
“dialectical obligations” in an implicit critical discussion (van Eemeren & 
Grootendorst, 2004), (1) accepting what constitutes the possible common ground – the 
function of the yes-clause; (2) justifying on what basis the contradiction with the 
opponent is raised – the function of the but-clause. 
These findings are not new. Antaki and Wetherell observe that such constructions 
can be particularly advantageous in environments where being rational and fairminded 
is important. Similarly, Lindström and Londen emphasize how yes, but... constructions 
indicate “an orientation to reflexivity, reciprocity and compromise” (2013, p. 349). 
However, rather than only mapping the sequences of agreement and disagreement, our 
analysis focuses on the argumentative relations in contexts that pave the way to 
“reflexivity, reciprocity and compromise”, showing that: 
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1) Similar sequential structures can involve different types of argumentative criticism: 
Concessions 1, 2 and 3 are all cases of the cardinal concessive scheme while conveying, 
respectively, the sufficiency, the relevance, and the acceptability criticisms.    
2) Different sequential structures can fulfil the same argumentative function, conveying 
the same type of criticism: Concessions 1 and 4 differ in their sequential organisation, 
yet they both undermine the sufficiency of the opponent’s argumentation. 
We see these results as an important contribution to understanding the functions 
of discursive devices such as yes, but…, and more generally, the management of 
disagreement in terms of the underlying argumentative functions generating 
conversational sequences and conventional speech acts. This has been a recurrent 
question in a “normative pragmatic” approach to analysing argumentative discourse 
(Jacobs & Jackson, 1989; van Eemeren at al., 1993).   
Naturally the sequencing of agreements and disagreements is a necessary step for 
analysing concessive constructions. Furthermore, as our analysis substantiated, the 
initial signal of agreement is a rhetorical move that allows the arguers to anchor their 
disagreements in matters of agreement, and render their viewpoints more agreeable 
(Billig, 1991). However, especially in public controversies such as the one over CC, the 
argumentative functions that govern these moves and structures are central to fully 
understanding disagreement management and negotiation of positions. 
Apart from the results discussed above, our analysis helps better understanding 
two dialogical phenomena well examined in the argumentation literature, but not 
directly in connection with yes, but… constructions: (1) dissociation and (2) re-
presentation of others’ discourse.  
 Dissociation is an argumentative technique of separating concepts into two 
contrasting elements, one of which is considered more valuable (Perelman & Olbrechts-
Tyteca, 1969, p. 190)vi. This is achieved by relying on stock “philosophical pairs”, the 
paradigmatic one being the “appearance vs. reality” pair: Yes, in a certain insignificant, 
apparent aspect X is the case, but in reality it is Y (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, 
pp. 415-436). Since one element of the concept can be rejected, while the other is 
asserted, dissociation serves as a device for resolving incompatibility. So understood, 
dissociation was frequently used by our interviewees. As was exemplified in the first 
and second excerpts, they employed the following pairs: ideal vs. actual, ethical vs. 
effective, ethical vs. psychological, scientific vs. political, and theoretical vs. practical. 
Such dissociations, in our view, signal that the speaker is restricted in denying a 
given assertion straightforwardly. This may be related to the nature of the current 
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consensus on the need for CC action. The consensus hinges upon a still fragile common 
ground of “beliefs, assumptions, and values that are presumed to be shared” (van Rees, 
2009, p. 114), having not yet stabilized as fully shared around the globe, or hegemonic 
(Uzelgun & Castro, in press). In such debates maintained by many controversial claims, 
a speaker striving to establish a new position may resort to dissociation “to evade or 
pre-empt an accusation of inconsistency” (van Rees, 2009, p. 113). 
We mentioned in a number of places above, that a critical complication in 
analysing concessive structures is the relationship – more precisely the difference – 
between what is originally said by one speaker (X) and what is then conceded to by 
another (X’). When discussing “Trojan Horse” concessions as “caricature descriptions” 
Antaki and Wetherell similarly bring up this concern:  
Note that we don’t mean that there is a ‘real’, objectively different and truer description. (…) 
When we say caricature, we mean to signal not a contrast with the ‘truth’ but rather that the 
description is hearably marked in a certain direction; what is at issue (for analysts) is not the 
reality of what is described but the interests the description serves. (Antaki & Wetherell, 1999, p. 
18).  
In short, when there is a significant, hearable difference between X and X’, we 
cannot but admit there is a problem that a detailed analysis cannot overlook, whether we 
call it a “caricature description”, a “Trojan Horse” or the “straw man fallacy”vii. The 
cases we reported (Excerpts 2 and 3) were more subtle – we cannot easily depict these 
as culpably straw-manning the activist. Yet, there surely was some kind of strategic 
manoeuvring between what might be rhetorically advantageous to the arguers in the 
given situation and what is reasonably acceptable by the rules of a dialectical discussion 
(van Eemeren, 2010). Crucially, rather than relying on extreme case formulations – a 
characteristic of caricature concessions (Antaki & Wetherell, 1999) and most straw man 
fallacies (Lewiński, 2011) – the concessions we analysed relied on non-extreme case 
formulations, and did not “cheapen” the case of the opponent. They were many times 
used for transforming the opponent’s case into something that is generally reasonably 
acceptable – simultaneously demonstrating that the arguer is not only aware but 
considerate of those views – but not agreeable under the particular circumstances. In 
any case, the subtle relations between what is originally stated and what is then 
conceded open a fascinating area of investigation. The same can be said about yes, 
but… constructions as linguistic vehicles for dissociation. The topic also warrants a 
stand-alone investigation that can benefit from recent in-depth studies of dissociation 
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within the pragma-dialectical framework by van Rees (2006, 2009) – a task for the 
future. 
Conclusion 
This article demonstrates that paying systematic attention not only to the sequencing of 
agreements and disagreements, but also to the relations between them, is helpful for a 
more complete account of yes, but… constructions. Our analysis suggests that further 
research into how people manage their disagreements in contexts of fragile consensus 
and controversy may benefit from examining what precisely is conceded in the yes-
clause, on the types of criticism raised in the but-clause, and on the argumentative 
manoeuvres achieved through these constructions. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
i This literature shows how the yes-clause can be expressed by a variety of markers (e.g. of course, I 
agree, obviously, naturally, you know), as can the but-clause (e.g. nevertheless, however, whereas, still, ii	  Please see the video-excerpt, starting from 1’30” to 3’30” (duration: 2m00s), at 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uk9Ev91jjQ8, and Appendix 1. iii	  Please see the video-excerpt, starting from the beginning to 02’20” (duration 2m20s), at 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uk9Ev91jjQ8, and Appendix 2. 
iv Our vocabulary follows the pragma-dialectical theory (van Eemeren, 2010). This does not exclude the 
use of different terminology – for instance, Toulmin’s (1958) “claim”, “data” and “warrant”. v	  The reconstructions can be obtained from the authors.	  
vi Couper-Kuhlen and Thompson (2000, p. 388ff.) use instead the term semantic partitioning.  
vii Antaki and Wetherell (1999, p. 21) do use the term tu quoque – a well-known argumentative fallacy – 
when discussing the “sting in the tail” concessions. 
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Appendix 1 
Video-excerpt 1: “UN and Global Warming” (Excerpt from a documentary by Michael 
Durkin, entitled “The Great Global Warming Swindle”) (UK, 2007). 
Please see the video-excerpt, starting from 1’30” to 3’30” (duration: 2m00s), at 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uk9Ev91jjQ8 
 
(A1)  (We should not take action to mitigate global warming) 
A1.1   There is no consensus among scientists on the global warming issue  
(A1.1’) (Scientific consensus is a necessary condition for taking action about global warming) 
A1.1  IPCC assessment reports cannot establish a consensus among scientists on the global 
warming issue 
A1.1.1  The IPCC second and third assessment reports do not refer to the truly  scientific 
literature.. the literature by specialists in those fields 
A1.1.1.1 There was a very disturbing corruption of the peer review process in these 
reports 
A1.1.1.1.1 The reports approved by contributing scientists were changed in 
response to comments from governments, individual scientists, and non-
governmental organizations 
A1.1.1.1.2 The IPCC officials have censored the comments of scientists in several 
key sections 
A1.1.1.1.2.1a  Statements like “there is no clear evidence for attributing the 
observed climate changes to man-made causes (i.e. the increase 
in GHGs)” were deleted 
A1.1.1.1.2.1b  After deleting some statements, the IPCC said there was no 
dishonesty or bias, and that uncertainties about the cause of 
global warming had been included 
A1.1.2 There are a number of scientists who don’t agree with this polemic, some of which 
resigned from IPCC but their names are still kept on the IPCC author list 
A1.2 I am one scientist and there are many that simply think that is not true that humans are 
causing a catastrophic change to the climate system 
R 
(p1) 
(p2) 
(p3) 
(p4)  
 
(p5) 
(p6) 
 
(p7) 
 
(p8) 
(p9) 
(p10) 
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Appendix 2 
Video-excerpt 2: “Carbon Offsets - A Peace Of Mind? (Kevin Smith)” 
Please see the video-excerpt, starting from the beginning to 02’20” (duration 2m20s), at 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uk9Ev91jjQ8 
(A1) (Carbon offsetting should not be used as a mechanism against the threat of climate crisis) 
A1.1 Carbon offsets are fictitious commodities (i.e. they do not deliver what they promise – they 
do not lead to the satisfaction of the goal) 
A1.1.1 You cannot neutralize your emissions once they’re out there 
A1.1.2 Carbon offsetting places all of the responsibility on individual consumers 
(A1.1.2’) (without there being a more profound systemic change, individual choices cannot 
offer an adequate solution to the threat of climate change) 
A1.1.2’.1a Individual choices / personal lifestyles have a role to play in how we respond 
to climate change 
A1.1.2’.1b our choices as individuals are still very limited within the system that 
organizes our societies and economies  
(A1.1.2’.1b’) (if our choices as individuals are very limited within the system that 
organizes our societies and economies then without there being a more profound 
systemic change, individual choices cannot offer an adequate solution to the threat 
of climate change) 
A1.2 Carbon offsetting is a dangerous mechanism (i.e., it has serious negative consequences) 
A1.2.1a It has been created to exploit the rising levels of climate consciousness 
A1.2.1b It makes people think that they don’t have to worry about the choices they make 
A1.2.1c It places all of the responsibility on individual consumers 
A1.2.1d The more emphasis we put on individuals, the more we’re moving away from what 
really needs to happen  
A1.2.1d.1 What really needs to happen is people to come together in communities, to 
create political pressure for the bigger systemic changes. 
A1.2.1d.1.1 people coming together in communities, to create political pressure will 
lead to bigger systemic changes  
A1.2.1d.1.1’ Bigger systemic change (in the growth based model, reigning at the 
corporate self-interest) is what needs to happen in response to the threat of 
climate crisis 
A1.2.1d.1.1’.1a Individual choices / personal lifestyles have a role to play in 
how we respond to climate change 
A1.2.1d.1.1’.1b our choices as individuals are still very limited within the 
system that organizes our societies and economies 
R 
(p1) 
(p2) 
(p3) 
(p4;  
if p3, p1)  
(p5) 
(p6) 
(if p6, p4)  
 
 
(p7) 
(p8) 
(p9) 
(p10) 
(p11)  
 
(p12) 
 
(p13) 
 
(p14; 
if p13, p12) 
 
(p15) 
(p16) 
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